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ABSTRACT
When applying formal verification to a system that interacts with
the real world we must use amodel of the environment. This model
represents an abstraction of the actual environment, but is necessar-
ily incomplete and hence presents an issue for system verification.
If the actual environment matches the model, then the verification
is correct; however, if the environment falls outside the abstrac-
tion captured by the model, then we cannot guarantee that the
system is well-behaved. A solution to this problem consists in ex-
ploiting the model of the environment for statically verifying the
system’s behaviour and, if the verification succeeds, using it also
for validating the model against the real environment via runtime
verification. The paper reports on a demonstration of the feasibility
of this approach using the Agent Java PathFinder model checker.
Trace expressions are used to model the environment for both static
formal verification and runtime verification.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Static formal verification of autonomous systems that interact with
the real world requires a model of the world to successfully accom-
plish the verification process. In [6, 9], L. A. Dennis, M. Fisher et al.
recommend using the simplest environment model, in which any
combination of the environmental predicates that correspond to
possible perceptions of the autonomous system is possible.
Consider for example an intelligent cruise control agent in an
autonomous vehicle, that can perceive the environmental pred-
icates safe, meaning that it is safe for the vehicle to accelerate,
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at_speed_limit, meaning that the vehicle reached its speed limit,
driver_brakes and driver_accelerates, meaning that the driver is
braking/accelerating.
In order to formally verify the behaviour of the cruise control
agent, we might randomly supply subsets of {safe, at_speed_limit,
driver_brakes, driver_accelerates} to it: the generation of each ran-
dom subset causes branching in the state space exploration during
verification so that, ultimately, all possible combinations are ex-
plored.
This model is an unstructured abstraction of the world, as it makes
no specific assumptions about the world behaviour and deals only
with the possible incoming perceptions that the system may react
to. Unstructured abstractions obviously lead to significant state
space explosion.
The state space explosion problem can be addressed by making
assumptions about the environment. For instance, we might assume
that a car can not both brake and accelerate at the same time:
subsets of environmental predicates containing both driver_brakes
and driver_accelerates should not be supplied to the agent during
the static verification stage, as they do not correspond to situations
that we believe likely in the actual environment. This structured
abstraction of the world is grounded on assumptions that help prune
the possible perceptions and hence control state space explosion.
Structured abstractions have advantages over unstructured ones,
provided that the assumptions they rely on are correct. Let us sup-
pose that the cruise control system crashes if the driver is acceler-
ating and braking at the same time. If the subsets of environmental
predicates generated to verify it never contain both driver_brakes
and driver_accelerates, then the static formal verification succeeds
but if one real driver, for whatever reason, operates both the accel-
eration and brake pedals at the same time, the real system crashes!
In this paper we propose an approach for exploiting all the ad-
vantages of structured abstractions, while mitigating their risks.
Our proposal consists in modelling the structured abstraction in
a formalism that can be used both for statically verifying the au-
tonomous system’s behaviour via model checking and for validating
the model against the real environment by means of runtime verifi-
cation (RV). If performed during a testing stage, RV of the actual
environment against its structured abstraction allows the developer
to identify situations not foreseen in the initial assumptions. He/she
can revise them, generate a new structured abstraction, re-verify it
via model checking, re-validate it via RV once again, reaching in the
end a “safe” abstraction. If RV takes place after system deployment
and assumption violations are detected, mechanisms for handing
control to a human, a failsafe system, or for performing ad hoc
reasoning about the current system safety should be invoked.
To demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed approach, we im-
plemented it on top of the MCAPL framework [7] (which provides
a model-checker, Agent Java Pathfinder (AJPF) for rational agents)
using trace expressions [1–3] as the single formalism to generate
both the environment model and the runtime monitor1.
The choice of trace expressions instead of more widely used
formalisms for model checking like Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
[10] is due to their expressive power: in [2], D. Ancona, A. Ferrando,
and V. Mascardi demonstrated that trace expressions are able to
express and verify sets of traces that are context-free – and even
more.
2 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
AJPF’s property specification language uses LTL extended with
modalities for BDI concepts such as beliefs (B (a,b) is interpreted as
meaning agent a believes b). In this language □ means “it is always
the case” and ♢ means “it is eventually the case”.
We carried out experiments using a simple rational agent for
intelligent cruise control implemented in Gwendolen [5], that
reacted to the perceptions safe, at_speed_lim, driver_brakes, and
driver_accelerates. When model checked using a typical hand-
constructed unstructured abstraction, verification takes 949 states
and 18:55 minutes to verify that it is always the case that eventually
the car believes is it safe or that it is in the process of braking:
□(B (car , safe) → □(♢B (car , safe) ∨ B (car ,brakinд))) (P1)
The condition B (car , safe) → at the start of the formula considers
the possibility that the car never believes it is safe and braking is
only triggered when the safe belief is removed.
To test our approach, we first constructed a trace expression to
represent an unstructured environment, similar to the one created
by hand, i.e., one where the four percepts could all either be true
or false at any moment. Verifying (P1) in an abstract model gener-
ated from this trace expression took 949 states and 20:04 minutes:
the behaviour was exactly the same as that for the unstructured
model that had been created manually. This validated that trace
expressions without constraints create unstructured abstractions
that behave the same way as hand crafted ones.
We then investigated the effect of structuring the model using a
trace expression that assumed both that the driver only accelerated
when it was safe to do so, and that the driver never accelerated
and braked at the same time. With this abstraction (P1) takes 4:45
minutes to prove using 355 states – this has more than halved the
time and the state space.
To illustrate how we cope with the risk that a structured abstrac-
tion may not reflect reality, we consider a version of the cruise
control agent with slight variations. It is widely considered impor-
tant that an autonomous vehicle should not be able to override the
1This implementation can be found in the MCAPL distribution,
mcapl.sourceforge.net. In particular the version used to generate the
results reported here can be found in the the runtime_verification branch of
the distribution. The technical details are documented in the manual (also available
from the distribution) and the experimental results can be found in the University of
Liverpool Data Catalogue DOI: 10.17638/datacat.liverpool.ac.uk/438
actions of a driver. Our original agent violated this rule – it would
only actually accelerate when the driver pressed the acceleration
pedal if it was safe to do so, and it would brake whenever it de-
tected unsafe conditions even if the driver was currently trying to
accelerate. We adapted the program, removing these restrictions.
This modified program could not be verified in the unstructured
model because our property is not actually true in that model – if
the driver continually accelerates in an unsafe situation then the car
can never brake. However, it is true in the structured model which
assumes that the driver never accelerates if the situation is unsafe.
We ran this program in a simple simulator of a motorway. In the
simulation it was indeed possible to cause a crash by accelerating
in unsafe conditions. This is where the runtime monitor fits in. The
monitor logs an exception at the moment when an unsafe accelera-
tion takes place and generates an error message revealing that the
constraint that the driver does not accelerate when conditions are
unsafe has been violated.
The example shows how we have addressed the development of
a principled mechanism for creating structured abstractions in a
way that allows us to provide at least some guarantee of the validity
of our results. We have demonstrated how trace expressions can be
used as a unifying formalism to generate both a structured abstrac-
tion for model checking and a runtime monitor. Their expressive
power paves the way to addressing challenging scenarios where:
(1) the behaviour of the system is modeled with a trace expres-
sion τ without expressive power limitations (for example,
an expression representing the set of all anbn traces, for any
n ∈ N; this set of traces cannot be modeled in LTL) to allow
specifications of complex environments;
(2) τ is over-approximated by a Java model as shown in [8];
(3) the model checking stage is performed using the generated
over-approximating Java model;
(4) the runtime verification stage uses τ , with all its expressive
power; empirical results show that in most cases verifying
whether a trace belongs to the language defined by a trace
expression is linear in the lenght of the trace: this means
that – even when the highest modeling expressivity of the
formalism is exploited –, performances of RV remain accept-
able.
In the future, we aim at providing arguments that the behaviour
of the abstract environments generated by the system genuinely
expresses the behaviour specified by the trace expressions. It would
also be desirable to express a greater range of constraints in these
models – for instance, the constraint that some belief can only
occur after some action is taken (e.g., that a car can only reach the
speed limit after an acceleration has been performed) where at the
moment we only model constraints between beliefs.
Finally, we plan to apply our approach to a real case study. The
scenario we have in mind is a cyberphysical system which must
demonstrate its dependability in order to be acceptable by the
society and be trusted by its users, like in [4]: in a remote patient
monitoring system where the program integrates sensory input,
formal guarantees should be provided on the fact that the system
respects some given medical guidelines (model checking stage),
and a RV stage looking at sensors perceptions should monitor that
those guidelines are continuously met.
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